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3.2.7 2011 Christchurch earthquake 
 
Charles Leleux, University of Stirling  
 
Nature of the adverse event 
 
Located on the South Island of New Zealand, and sitting within the Canterbury 
region, the city of Christchurch (population: 341,000) is the country’s second largest 
city.459 Originally inhabited by the indigenous Maori populations, the first Europeans 
were thought to have settled in what became Christchurch in the early 1840s, with 
their original trades being whaling and farming.460 The Mw6.3 earthquake which hit 
Christchurch unexpectedly and catastrophically on 22 February 2011 at 12.51 killed 
over 180 people, injured a further 1500-2000, and was in fact an aftershock of a 
previous earthquake (Mw7.1) occurring on 4 September 2010 which resulted in no 
fatalities.461 The Canterbury Television (CTV) building which collapsed resulted in 
the loss of 115 lives. After the earthquake on 22 February 2011 it was estimated that 
800 business premises in the central business district (CBD), where most of the 
fatalities occurred, plus 10,000 domestic properties would require to be demolished, 
and that the economic costs of repairing the damage would be in the region of US 
$11-15 billion.462 Most of the fatalities were caused by soil liquefaction leading to 
lateral movement of buildings, tilting of buildings, falling masonry and collapse of 
both reinforced and unreinforced buildings.463 An extensive study of the performance 
of masonry buildings and churches was commissioned in March 2011, i.e. the month 
following the earthquake, by the New Zealand Natural Hazards Research Platform, 
and recommendations from the subsequent report later that year, included 
“appropriate seismic retrofit and remediation techniques for stone masonry 
                                                 
459 Statistics New Zealand, 2013 Census of Population and Dwellings. 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census/data-tables/population-dwelling-tables.aspx 
460 Christchurch City Council, “History”. http://www.christchurch.org.nz/about/history.aspx 
461 Reyners, Martin, “Lessons from the destructive Mw 6.3 Christchurch, New Zealand, earthquake”,  
Seismological Research Letters, Vol. 82, No. 3, 2011, pp. 371-372. 
462 Ibid. 
463 Cubrinovski, Misko, Jonathan D. Bray, Merrick Taylor, Simona Giorgini, Brendon Bradley, Liam 
Wotherspoon, and Joshua Zupan, “Soil liquefaction effects in the central business district during the 
February 2011 Christchurch earthquake”, Seismological Research Letters Vol. 82, No. 6, 2011, pp. 
893-904. 
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buildings”.464  A Royal Commission was also established to investigate the reasons 
for building failure, due to the two earthquakes, and sat between 2011 and 2012, 
making various recommendations regarding the future preparation of regional and 
district plans, and the need for greater involvement of structural engineers and 
geotechnical surveys at the planning stages of applications for construction projects. 
The main difference between the Christchurch earthquakes of September 2010 and 
February 2011, was that the former event occurred out with the CBD area, and 
although very powerful and causing much damage, the epicentre of the latter event 
was fairly close to the CBD, causing many buildings to collapse with subsequent loss 
of life.465 
 
Awareness amongst public bodies of the likelihood of ground movements and 
earthquakes in this area was high, although the September 2010 and February 2011 
earthquakes occurred on fault lines which the authorities were not aware of, occurring 
on “……previously unknown fault lines in a region of historically low seismicity but 
within the zone of plate boundary deformation between the Pacific and Australian 
plates”.466  Pettinga et al, record that there are around ninety major earthquake source 
faults around the Canterbury region, which includes Christchurch, and characterise 
these faults according to “type (sense of slip), geometry (fault dimensions and 
attitude) and activity (slip rates, single event displacements, recurrence intervals, and 
timing of last rupture)”.467 Pettinga et al also provide an historical account of 
earthquakes taking place in Christchurch and the wider Canterbury region, notably 
those taking place in 1869, 1870, 1888, 1902, 1922, 1929 and 1994.468 Various 
regional, national and international monitoring systems were already recording on a 
daily basis, any changes in ground conditions and seismological activity, and various 
modelling techniques were also in use to predict the likelihood and frequency of such 
a major event taking place.469 The Christchurch earthquake of 22 February 2011, 
which was not predicted by the scientific community (although there were significant 
ground movements recorded), was the worst to hit New Zealand since the Hawkes 
Bay earthquake in 1931.470 The Mw7.8 earthquake which took place on 2 February 
1931 at Hawkes Bay on the North Island, severely damaged two towns, Napier and 
Hastings, and resulted in the loss of 256 lives, with the surrounding area suffering 
                                                 
464 Dizhur, Dmytro, Jason Ingham, Lisa Moon, Mike Griffith, Arturo Schultz, Ilaria Senaldi, Guido 
Magenes et al, “Performance of masonry buildings and churches in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch 
earthquake”, Bulletin of the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, Vol. 44, No. 4, 
December 2011, pp. 279-295. 
465 Ibid. 
466 Beavan, John, Eric Fielding, Mahdi Motagh, Sergey Samsonov, and Nic Donnelly, “Fault location 
and slip distribution of the 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 Christchurch, New Zealand, earthquake from 
geodetic data” Seismological Research Letters, Vol. 82, No. 6, 2011, pp. 789-799. 
467 Pettinga, Jarg R., Mark D. Yetton, Russ J. Van Dissen, and Gaye Downes, “Earthquake source 
identification and characterisation for the Canterbury region, South Island, New Zealand”, Bulletin of 
the New Zealand National Society for Earthquake Engineering, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2001, pp. 282-317. 
468 Ibid. 
469 Cubrinovski, Misko, Jonathan D. Bray, Merrick Taylor, Simona Giorgini, Brendon Bradley, Liam 
Wotherspoon, and Joshua Zupan, “Soil liquefaction effects in the central business district during the 
February 2011 Christchurch earthquake”, Seismological Research Letters, Vol. 82, No. 6, 2011, pp. 
893-904. 
470 Kaiser, A., C. Holden, J. Beavan, D. Beetham, R. Benites, A. Celentano, D. Collett et al, “The Mw 
6.2 Christchurch earthquake of February 2011: Preliminary report,” New Zealand Journal of Geology 
and Geophysics, Vol. 55, No. 1, 2012, pp. 67-90. 
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aftershocks and further earthquakes in the weeks and months following.471 The extent 
to which the local community, local agencies and national bodies demonstrated their 
resilience both prior to and following the event on 22 February 2011 including the use 
of any surveillance technologies, is examined in the following sections.   
 
Institutional response 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake on 22 February 2011 responsibility for 
control of the areas affected fell to John Hamilton, the Director of Civil Defence 
Emergency Management,472 who established communications with the National Crisis 
Management Centre in Wellington, the local Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management Group in Christchurch, and Christchurch City Council. The Ministry of 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management responded quickly by issuing a fairly 
short but purposeful media release at 15.30 on 22 February (only two hours and forty 
minutes after the earthquake struck). The media release advised people on where the 
earthquake was centralised; the operational status of Christchurch hospital and the 
airport, plus made suggestions about keeping cellphone usage to a minimum as the 
network was struggling due to heavy demand from people trying to contact loved 
ones; avoiding travelling by road unless absolutely necessary, and encouraging people 
to keep updated by listening to local radio and Radio New Zealand.473 Further advice 
was also provided in the same media release about personal safety in and around the 
home, paying particular attention to utility services, including links to various 
websites. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management issued 
additional media releases on 23 February providing a Red Cross Person Enquiry 
Helpline, and on 24 February on how to make cash donations to help people affected 
by the disaster:  
 
The Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management is stressing that cash 
donations are the best way to support people affected by the Canterbury 
earthquake.474 
 
The New Zealand Government declared a State of National Emergency on 23 
February 2011; this lasted for nearly nine weeks. The Government also acted with 
impressive speed in passing the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 on 18 
April 2011 less than two months after the event, the purposes of which included not 
only the physical rebuilding of properties and infrastructure, but also the rebuilding of 
social capital: 
 
(a) to provide appropriate measures to ensure that greater Christchurch and the 
councils and their communities respond to, and recover from, the impacts of the 
Canterbury earthquakes 
(b) to enable community participation in the planning of the recovery of affected 
communities without impeding a focused, timely, and expedited recovery 
                                                 
471 Eiby, G. A., “An annotated list of New Zealand earthquakes, 1460–1965”, New Zealand Journal of 
Geology and Geophysics, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1968, pp. 630-647. 
472 Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management.  http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/ 
473 Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management.  
http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/memwebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Media-Media-release-archive-
Index?OpenDocument 
474 Ibid. 
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(c) to provide for the Minister and CERA (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Agency) 
to ensure that recovery 
(d) to enable a focused, timely, and expedited recovery 
(e) to enable information to be gathered about any land, structure, or infrastructure 
affected by the Canterbury earthquakes 
(f) to facilitate, co-ordinate, and direct the planning, rebuilding, and recovery of 
affected communities, including the repair and rebuilding of land, infrastructure, and 
other property, and 
(g) to restore the social, economic, cultural, and environmental well-being of greater 
Christchurch communities.475   
 
CERA476 was established by the New Zealand Government through the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 shortly after the earthquake to work closely with other 
agencies, such as regional, city and district councils, and in particular Christchurch 
City Council (CCC).477 Primary responsibilities of CERA included governance; 
infrastructure coordination and planning; planning and deconstruction of buildings 
(jointly in many cases with CCC); economic recovery coordination; skills and 
workforce planning, and welfare rebuild coordination. A formal Cost Sharing 
Agreement was also put in place between the Crown and CCC. The extent to which 
tensions emerged between the various agencies, and in particular CERA and CCC, in 
the course of inter-agency working, is examined under the section ‘Economic 
Response’. 
 
The Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission was established to report on the 
causes of building failure as a result of the earthquakes as well as the legal and best 
practice requirements for buildings in New Zealand Central Business Districts. The 
Inquiry began in April 2011 and was completed in November 2012. The Chair of the 
Royal Commission, Justice Mark Cooper gave the following commitment to those 
affected by the disaster, “Those who lost relatives and friends in the 22 February 
earthquake can be assured that there will be a very thorough inquiry into the failure of 
buildings that resulted in loss of life”.478 
 
The Royal Commission produced their report in three parts, with some of the key 
recommendations including: regional and district plans to be prepared on the basis 
that they acknowledge the potential effects of earthquakes and liquefaction; regional 
and district authorities to be adequately informed about seismicity of their regions and 
districts; applicants must ensure geotechnical and structural engineering information 
is provided from professionally qualified persons, and greater powers for councils to 
ensure the involvement of structural engineering experts in the planning application 
process.   
 
Societal Response 
 
                                                 
475 New Zealand Parliament, Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011.  
http://legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2011/0012/latest/DLM3653522.html?src=qs 
476 CERA, Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Agency. http://cera.govt.nz/about-cera/roles-and-
responsibilities 
477 Christchurch City Council. 
http://ccc.govt.nz/Content/Search/SearchResults.aspx?query=christchurch+earthquake&btnG=Search 
478 Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission. http://canterbury.royalcommission.govt.nz/ 
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Turning firstly to the argument that society perhaps contributed in some way to the 
effects of the Christchurch disaster of 22 February 2011, it could not reasonably or 
justifiably be claimed that the city and its surrounding environment were formed in a 
place which is susceptible to such an event, and therefore society could be blamed in 
part for the consequences of this naturally occurring event. As outlined in the 
previous section, although there were numerous known geological faults in the wider 
Canterbury region, with several recorded earthquake events occurring in the previous 
century, and with daily monitoring of ground conditions taking place, the two 
earthquakes which took place in September 2010 and February 2011 occurred on 
geological fault lines which were unknown to the scientific community. The 
catastrophic earthquake which occurred on 22 February 2011 caused damage, 
destruction and fatalities on a scale unrecorded in Christchurch previously, did so 
despite the seismological technology at the disposal of the scientific community.  
 
Regarding the resilience of the built environment, it is clear from studies which have 
been undertaken that it was not sufficient enough to withstand the effects of the 
earthquake, in particular in the CBD. Both reinforced and unreinforced office 
buildings collapsed or were damaged as a result of which people lost their lives. In 
particular, the Canterbury Television building (CTV) which collapsed, resulted in the 
loss of 115 lives. The technical study commissioned by the New Zealand Natural 
Hazards Research Platform involved an international team of scientists who 
documented and interpreted the destruction and damage to over 2000 buildings which 
were both reinforced and unreinforced, including churches, commercial and domestic 
properties. They investigated the failure patterns and collapse mechanisms that were 
commonly encountered, and found unsurprisingly that unreinforced buildings 
sustained far greater damage than reinforced ones. The findings concluded: 
 
that when subjected to the higher forces generated by the earthquake on 22nd 
February 2011, Christchurch’s unreinforced masonry building stock sustained much 
greater and more widespread damage than in the 4th September 2010 earthquake. 
Cases of severe structural damage to RCM (reinforced concrete masonry) buildings 
were found in the vicinity of the CBD. Structural damage to these buildings has been 
documented and is currently being studied to establish the lessons which can be 
learned from this earthquake and how to incorporate these lessons into future RCM 
design and construction.479 
 
The extensive technical recommendations of the Royal Commission480 include 
improving the geotechnical information available for building sites; far greater 
involvement of structural engineers in the planning process, and greater information 
to be available to the relevant authorities on seismicity of regions and districts.  
Significantly, the study did not document the performance of reinforced buildings 
against unreinforced ones in terms of numbers of lives lost. 
 
Turning to examples the development of social capital, New Zealand Tourism has 
promoted positive upbeat messages, reflecting the resilience of the city and its people, 
following the earthquake to encourage tourists to continue to visit Christchurch: 
                                                 
479 Dizhur, Dmytro, Jason Ingham, Lisa Moon, Mike Griffith, Arturo Schultz, Ilaria Senaldi, Guido 
Magenes et al, “Performance of masonry buildings and churches in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch 
earthquake”, Bulletin of the New Zealand Society For Earthquake Engineering, Vol. 44, No. 4, 
December 2011, pp. 279-295. 
480 Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission. http://canterbury.royalcommission.govt.nz/ 
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The city has bounced back after a series of earthquakes, and all public services and 
spaces are running as normal.481  
 
The buildings may have been damaged but the soul of the city and the welcoming 
spirit of the people remain very much intact. Don’t miss visiting Christchurch.482 
 
The University of Canterbury created the CEISMIC Programme (Canterbury 
Earthquake Images, Stories and Media Integrated Collection) to provide access to a 
broad range of earthquake-related research material, gathered by leading New 
Zealand cultural and educational organisations: 
 
Our task now is to increase the content available through UC CEISMIC search, and 
ensure it is safeguarded for future generations. We've cast a net over our cultural 
heritage community to give the people of Christchurch and New Zealand a single 
place to create, remember and research their heritage, but we need your help to build 
it. You're also invited to contribute to our efforts.483 
 
A Christchurch local resident, Adam Hutchison created the website 
whenmyhomeshook.co.nz484 for children to record and openly share their earthquake 
stories. These accounts may become part of the UC CEISMIC archive. The New 
Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management in their media release 
on 22 February 2011 called on citizens to assist vulnerable people who may need help 
due to the effects of the earthquake, “help people who require special assistance - 
infants, elderly people, those without transportation, large families who may need 
additional help, people with disabilities, and the people who care for them”. 485 
 
CERA, in a press release on 18 March, 2014, provided results of the Third Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Authority Wellbeing Survey, with 2,476 residents being 
selected randomly from the electoral roll in Christchurch city, and the surrounding 
districts of Selwyn and Waimakariri, with around 75% of Greater Christchurch 
residents being satisfied with the positivity of their life: It stated, “overall three 
quarters of Greater Christchurch residents rate the quality of their life positively, 
which remains consistent with surveys taken in September 2012 and April 2013.”486 
CERA chief executive Roger Sutton is quoted as saying that the results show that the 
earthquakes are now having less of an impact on many residents’ lives than six 
months ago. “While most respondents do acknowledge there are areas of their lives 
which are still affected by the earthquakes, the focus has changed. We used to hear 
about the anxiety people felt about aftershocks, dealing with frightened children and 
                                                 
481 New Zealand Tourism. http://www.newzealand.com/uk/christchurch/  
482 New Zealand Tourism. http://www.newzealand.com/uk/christchurch-canterbury/  
483 University of Canterbury. http://www.ceismic.org.nz/ 
484 http://whenmyhomeshook.co.nz/ 
485 Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management. 
http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/memwebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Media-Media-release-archive-
Index?OpenDocument 
486 CERA. http://cera.govt.nz/news/2014/secondary-stressors-now-a-larger-factor-for-earthquake-
affected-residents-18-march-2014 
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work safety concerns.” “Those stressors are being replaced with frustrations about 
traffic, and other work-related issues.”487 
CERA’s webpages provide an extensive range of links to assist members of the public 
and communities. The community resilience webpage contains positive language 
specifically directed towards recovering from the earthquakes: 
 
Community resilience requires participation from the whole community to improve 
response and recovery, and to help the community plan for the future. The impact and 
effect of the earthquakes have been different for each and every one of us. As a wider 
community we are all in this together. It’s important that we continue to champion 
the strong sense of community that helped us manage and move forward following 
the earthquakes. 488 
 
Economic response 
 
In the media release issued on 24 February 2011 the Ministry of Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management directed advice to local businesses who were keen to offer 
expertise, and to people wishing to volunteer, who were advised to wait, and not to 
send employees or resources or to go to Christchurch themselves. Instead, they were 
advised, “when local authorities have a clear idea of what is needed and are in a 
position to manage goods and volunteers they will advise publicly what is needed and 
where.”489 
 
Responsibility for economic recovery coordination and skills/workforce planning fell 
to CERA, working in partnership with local, city and regional councils and other 
agencies. The Canterbury Economic Recovery Dashboard provided monthly updates 
on the earthquake recovery in Christchurch.490 The latest published dashboard report, 
August 2013, supplied information represented in graphs, including the following 
areas, most of which showed an upward trajectory of growth and improvement: 
output, consumer spend, agriculture, manufacturing, services, tourism, investment, 
housing, insurance, business development, population, employment, and spending.491 
 
CERA, as part of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery project, is using a Better 
Business Case model to consider projects and programmes requiring Crown 
investment in whole or in part. The model is based on five key cases: strategic, 
economic, commercial, financial and management, and overall how the case meets 
the recovery strategy. Funding decisions are then made after an evaluation of the 
respective business cases.492 The Canterbury Economic Indicators Quarterly Report, 
August 2013 gives a more in-depth analysis of the economic recovery and response, 
as evident in the following upbeat summary: 
 
                                                 
487 Ibid. 
488 CERA. http://cera.govt.nz/community-resilience 
489 Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management.  
http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/memwebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Media-Media-release-archive-
Index?OpenDocument 
490 CERA. http://cera.govt.nz/economic-indicators 
491 CERA. http://cera.govt.nz/sites/cera.govt.nz/files/common/canterbury-economic-recovery-
dashboard-august-2013.pdf 
492 CERA. http://cera.govt.nz/better-business-cases 
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The Canterbury economy continues to grow and consumer confidence remains 
steady. International and domestic tourism is returning to pre-earthquake levels and 
more taxpayers are migrating into greater Christchurch than migrating out. 
Commercial investment remains significantly more optimistic for Canterbury than for 
the rest of New Zealand: greater Christchurch has been the most confident 
commercial property investment market every quarter since 2011, according to 
Colliers International results of June 2013. However, such high rates of growth 
present challenges as well as opportunities. Noticeably, house prices and rents are 
rising steadily. The higher demand in the labour market is putting pressure on 
employers who are having difficulties in finding skilled labour.493 
 
The economic response appears to have been successfully managed and coordinated 
by CERA as the previous summary from the Canterbury Economic Indicators Report 
demonstrates. Undoubtedly, achieving this level of sustained progress will have been 
dependent upon very high levels of capital funding, inter-agency working and co-
operation, however, however the position is unclear regarding the success of inter-
agency co-operation. There have been tensions between the various agencies or 
personalities working within them during the renewal process, and in particular 
between CERA and Christchurch City Council (CCC), a fact acknowledged by CERA 
Chief Executive, Roger Sutton. In responding to criticism that the rebuild was taking 
too long, Sutton admitted that the rebuild was a bigger project than he initially 
thought and that relationships with the government and local council had at times 
been volatile: 
 
When asked about the strained relationship between CERA and the Christchurch City 
Council, Mr Sutton said: "We'd like to think that we're here to make it work, we're 
here to help and we're trying to support this community’’’.494 
 
Most likely, these tensions will have come to prominence over the uncomfortable fit 
between the democratically elected city council with their agreed governance 
procedures for consultation, decision making and accountability, and the more direct 
decision making processes employed by CERA. Tensions between CERA and CCC 
also surfaced over the city’s housing shortages, with the two bodies committing to 
work together to address the problem, which has driven up rents and house prices, 
with the problem predicted to worsen up until 2017: 
 
I would like to think this is a new start . . . that we can work together. There is so 
much at stake," council housing committee chairman Cr Glenn Livingstone said 
yesterday (27.11.13).’495 
   
Critical conclusions from an IRISS perspective 
• Surveillance technologies were deployed extensively to monitor ground 
movements and other seismological activity, however the earthquake on 22 
February, 2011 was not predicted by the scientific community and occurred on 
a previously unnown fault line; 
                                                 
493 CERA, “Canterbury Economic Indicators”, August 2013. 
http://cera.govt.nz/sites/cera.govt.nz/files/common/canterbury-economic-indicators-quarterly-report-
august-2013.pdf 
494 TVNZ. http://tvnz.co.nz/national-news/christchurch-rebuild-balancing-act-cera-5846679 
495 Cairns, Lois, “Housing pinch to worsen until 2017”, The Press, 27 November 2013. 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/business/your-property/9446008/Housing-pinch-to-worsen-until-2017 
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• The resilience of the built environment, particularly in some parts of the 
central business district, was found not to be have been sufficient enough to 
withstand the effects of the earthquake, and lessons learned from both an 
extensive survey and a  Royal Commission Inquiry will used for future RCM 
(reinforced concrete masonry) design and construction; regional and district 
planning, supply of geotechnical and seismological information, and greater 
use of structural engineering information and expertise in planning application 
processes;  
• The immediate institutional response in terms of media communications was 
informative, practical and appropriate, and a state of emergency was declared 
the day following the event by the New Zealand Government, continuing for 
around nine weeks;  
• The enduring institutional response saw the passing of an Act of Parliament, 
within two months of the disaster, and the creation of a dedicated agency: the 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Agency (CERA), which is continuing to 
support both the physical rebuild of properties and infrastructure, and the 
social capital of the Canterbury region and Christchurch city; 
• The resilience of the agencies involved in the rebuild of the physical, 
economic and social infrastructure is clearly evident and successful according 
to the Canterbury Economic Indicators Report (August 2013), however there 
have been criticisms that the rebuild is too slow, and there is evidence of 
tensions and volatility in particular between CERA and CCC, and     
• The rebuilding of social capital has been extensive and has involved many 
agencies working on different aspects, including keeping channels open for 
communities and individuals including children to record their ‘stories’ such 
as oral history projects, and in particular the CEISMIC project established by 
the University of Canterbury whose objective is collect material relating to the 
earthquake and to give the people of Christchurch and New Zealand a single 
place to create, remember and research their heritage.496    
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3.3 STRESSING EVENTS THAT CONTINUE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME 
 
This section covers the second type of adverse events – stressing events that continue 
over a period of time. 
 
3.3.1 Resilience after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis  
 
Professor Kirstie Ball, Open University 
 
Introduction 
 
Events surrounding the financial crisis of 2008 provide potentially significant insight 
into resilience-building in capitalist societies. They also reflect some problems with 
the concept of resilience and the protracted policy focus thereon. This short report 
will outline the findings of a literature review into issues of resilience surrounding the 
financial crisis. It will highlight the aspects of the financial system which need to be 
made more resilient in future. It also tackles the problem of path-dependency in 
society-level constructions of resilience as well as the elitism inherent in popular 
constructions of the concept. The report proceeds as follows. The first section outlines 
the sequence of events which prompted the financial crisis in 2008. It then examines 
the elements of the financial system which would need to be addressed in order for it 
to be made more resilient in future. Finally, it provides some critical reflections on the 
concept of resilience. 
 
The Global Financial Crisis 2008 
 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 had its origins in the US and UK housing 
markets. Increases in house prices, excessive liquidity in financial markets coupled 
with the easy availability of credit led to a growth in mortgage lending, as sub-prime 
mortgages emerged in the USA and UK. Alongside the growth in sub-prime 
